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NRC INSPECTION MANUAL PDND
INSPECTION PROCEDURE 62801
MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
AT PERMANENTLY SHUTDOWN REACTORS
PROGRAM APPLICABILITY:  2561
SALP FUNCTIONAL AREA:  N/A
62801-01 INSPECTION  OBJECTIVE
01.01 To verify that maintenance and surveillance for
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are being conducted in
a manner that results in the safe storage of spent fuel and proper
operation of radiation monitoring and effluent control equipment at
permanently shutdown reactors.  To evaluate the effec-tiveness of
the licensee in maintaining adequate material and structural
integrity of SSCs important to safe decommissioning.
01.02 To ascertain whether the licensee has an effective
maintenance program that implements the maintenance rule (10 CFR
50.65) relative to the safe storage, maintenance, and control of
spent fuel.
62801-02 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
02.01 Verify by direct observation, conducting reviews, and
interviewing licensee personnel that maintenance and surveillance
are performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and result
in the safe storage of spent fuel and reliable operation of
radiation  monitoring and effluent control equipment.   This
includes the proper implementation of technical specifications (TS)
maintenance and surveillance requirements.
Perform an examination of planned or completed maintenance and
surveillance activities to assess the maintenance and surveillance
process from its inception to its completion.
a. Plant Walkthrough Inspections.  The inspector should conduct
a plant walkthrough inspection and assess the general
material condition of SSCs associated with the safe storage
of spent fuel, radiological effluent controls, and radiation
protection.  This inspection should include an assessment of
lighting, electrical distribution, fire protection equipment,62801 - 2 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
housekeeping, and material condition in all areas of the
plant with particular focus on SSCs described in the TSs,
Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR),
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR, or equivalent), and/or
license termination plan (LTP).Issue Date:  08/11/97 - 3 - 62801
b. Work Identification Process.  Review licensee methods for
capturing items which go into their maintenance system.
Plant walkthroughs should be used to assess the deficiency-
threshold required for an item to enter the work
identification process.
c. Machinery  History and Operating Logs.  Review selected
machinery history and operating logs to determine if any
patterns exist which may indicate maintenance problems.
Assess the effectiveness of preventative maintenance based on
maintenance history and vendor documentation.
d. Maintenance Backlog.  Review the current backlog and assess
the age and prioritization of the items.  Determine how often
the licensee updates and reviews the backlog.  Assess whether
goals have been established for the completion of items and
whether there is method to bring additional management
attention and resources to bear on items which have been on
the list for a long time.  Determine whether the timeliness
of corrective actions is commensurate with safety.  Identify
whether backlog items create operational work-a-rounds or
system line-ups different than described in the PSDAR, FSAR,
or LTP.
e. Work Prioritization System.  Review the licensee's work
prioritization system.  Assess whether redundancy and the
importance and function of equipment are taken into account.
Determine whether other special factors (such as weather,
staffing, and status of decommissioning), are considered by
management in their work prioritization strategy.
f. Conduct of Maintenance and Surveillance.  Select two or more
maintenance and surveillance activities and verify that the
following considerations were conducted:
1. That the SSCs were properly released for maintenance or
surveillance.  This review includes an assessment of
planning, scheduling, tagouts, and approvals.
2. That the licensee adequately assessed the availability
and operability of redundant TS systems, or systems
credited in accident mitigation or offsite dose
projections (as described in licensing basis
documentation).  The inspector should ascertain whether
the licensee has assessed the impact of removing the
particular SSC from service on the remaining SSCs and its
effect on site-wide activities (such as systems shared
between multiple units).
3. That appropriate personnel safety, fire protection, and
radiation  safety considerations were established and
implemented.  This includes as-low-as-reasonably-
achievable (ALARA) reviews, pre-job training and/or
briefs, mock-up training, security, and housekeeping.62801 - 4 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
4. That adequate management oversight, quality assurance, or
peer reviews were implemented to enhance the quality of
maintenance or surveillance.
5. That the maintenance or surveillance was conducted in
accordance  with instructions appropriate to the
circumstances.  Elements indicative of adequate work
instructions may include, in part:  written instructions;
references to vendor literature; precautions and
prerequisites;  quality control  checks, such as QC
inspection hold points and dual verification
requirements;  verification of measuring and test
equipment (M & TE); and, control of special processes.
Other considerations include cleanliness requirements;
fire protection; security; housekeeping; lifted leads,
jumper, and mechanical block controls; and, verification
that replacement parts were equivalent or better than
original specifications.  This review should include the
in-field verification that the maintenance or
surveillance is being conducted as described in licensee
procedures.
6. That the post-maintenance testing, calibration, and
surveillance are adequate to verify operability of the
SSC that was repaired, replaced, or maintained.  This
includes verification that personnel performing the
restoration  activities are properly trained and
qualified, that procedural, TS, or other acceptance
criteria were met prior to the declaration of
operability.
7. That preventive maintenance contributes to SSC
reliability, and was completed as scheduled by the
licensee.
8. That the cause(s) of equipment failures are evaluated, if
required, to ensure that the maintenance (whether its
repair, replacement, or etc.) will maintain or enhance
reliability.
g. Troubleshooting.  Observe and evaluate "troubleshooting"
activities, including the use of lifted leads and jumpers
and/or changes to the configuration of the electrical circuit
or mechanical system.  Such changes could result in
unreviewed or unanalyzed design changes, inoperability, or
configurations  differently than described in the FSAR.
Verify that the  system was removed from service for
troubleshooting or that on-line troubleshooting was evaluated
and approved.  Verify that the activity was controlled with
appropriate instructions, tagouts, and approvals.  Verify
that the system was properly returned to service.
02.02  Implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65).
Review the licensee's program to implement the Maintenance Rule.
For licensee's who have submitted the 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)
certifications, the Maintenance Rule applies to those SSC'sIssue Date:  08/11/97 - 5 - 62801
associated with the storage, control, and maintenance of spent
fuel.
a. Monitoring, 50.65(a)(1).  Verify that the licensee has
implemented SSC monitoring as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).
This program shall monitor the performance or condition of
SSC's monitored under (a)(1) against established goals, in a
manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such
SSC's are capable of fulfilling their intended functions.
These goals (i.e., performance objectives) shall be
commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into
account industry-wide experience.  The program shall require
the implementation of appropriate corrective actions when the
performance of an SSC does not meet established goals.
b. Preventive Maintenance Alternative, 50.65(a)(2).  Paragraph
(a)(2) of the maintenance rule allows the licensee to
demonstrate that the performance or condition of an SSC can
be effectively controlled through the performance of
appropriate  preventative maintenance, such that the SSC
remains capable of performing its intended function.  Or, the
SSC could be inherently reliable  and of low safety
significance, therefore, preventive maintenance may not be
required.  For those SSCs that are within the scope of the
rule, but are not monitored under paragraph (a)(1), verify
that appropriate preventive maintenance is demonstrated
through monitoring of paragraph (a)(2).  Verify that the
licensee has established appropriate performance criteria and
monitoring to demonstrate that the performance or condition
of the SSC is effectively controlled through the performance
of preventive maintenance.
c. Periodic Evaluation, 50.65(a)(3).  Verify that the licensee
is periodically evaluating and assessing the performance of
their SSCs, as required by 50.65(a)(3).
1. Ascertain whether the licensee is evaluating performance
and condition monitoring, associated goals/performance
objectives, and preventive  maintenance, taking into
account industry-wide experience when practical, on a
periodic basis.
2. Verify that the licensee is adjusting/revising its
program to ensure that the objective of preventing
failures of SSCs through maintenance is appropriately
balanced against the objective of minimizing
unavailability due to out-of-service time caused by
monitoring or preventive maintenance.
3. The inspector should assess whether the licensee has
assessed the impact of the plant equipment that is out of
service and determined the overall effect on site
activities or shared SSCs.
d. Scope of the Rule 50.65(b).  Verify that the licensee has
identified those SSCs associated with the storage, control,
and maintenance of spent fuel, and that the licensee has62801 - 6 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
determined whether they are within scope of the Maintenance
Rule.
62801-03 INSPECTION GUIDANCE
General Guidance
This inspection procedure resulted, in part, from long-term actions
taken by the NRC in response to Bulletin 94-01, "Potential Fuel
Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate Maintenance Practices at
Dresden Unit 1," and a determination by the NRC staff that NRC
inspection of decommissioning power reactors provides additional
assurance that licensed activities will not be adverse to public
health and safety of the environment.  A primary objective of this
IP is to ensure that each licensee has implemented an adequate
maintenance and surveillance program in accordance with regulatory
requirements.  Section 01.01 of this IP applies to all phases of
decommissioning from the permanent cessation of reactor operations
to license termination and site release.  Section 02.02, applies as
long as the licensee maintains a Part 50 license.  Section 02.02
also applies to independent spent fuel storage facilities (ISFSIs)
licensed under 10 CFR 72, Subpart K, "General License for Storage
of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites."
The  inspector is not required to complete all the inspection
requirements listed in this IP, nor is the inspector limited to
those inspection requirements listed if safety concerns are
identified.  However, the objectives of this IP shall be met and
performance of this inspection shall be commensurate with the NRC
staff's assessment of licensee performance.  The inspection should
also focus on a periodic verification that the quality of
maintenance and surveillance does not diminish as the licensee
completes decommissioning.
Except where the licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method
for complying with specific portions of the Maintenance Rule (10
CFR 50.65), the methods described in Regulatory Guide 1.160,
"Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power
Plants," should be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
licensee in implementing the requirements as stated in 50.65.  This
regulatory guide endorses NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power
Plants," and provides methods acceptable to the NRC for complying
with the requirements of the rule.
Specific Guidance
03.01
a. Plant walkthrough inspections will allow the inspector to
determine the quality and effectiveness of the licensee at
maintaining their power reactor site.  The inspector should
review the licensee documented housekeeping and material
deficiency  observations, assess the status of corrective
actions, and evaluate trends and whether conditions existIssue Date:  08/11/97 - 7 - 62801
that are adverse to spent fuel storage or radiological
safety.  This review will also provide insight into the
resources, and level of ownership applied to maintain the
power reactor site in a manner commensurate with plant and
personnel safety.  A deterioration of the effectiveness of
the maintenance program could be observed on a plant
walkthrough.  The inspector should be cognizant of
decommissioning projects and be cognizant of propped open
fire doors; stationing of fire watches and establishment of
fire protection controls; overloading of temporary electrical
power supplies and junction boxes; temporary scaffolding or
engineered features for the structural support of walls,
floors and ceiling; and, personnel access and egress routes
for exigent situations.  Further, the inspector should be
knowledgeable of the descriptions of the site and SSCs as
detailed in licensing  basis documentation and evaluate
whether the configuration of the plant reflects docketed
descriptions.
b. The licensee work identification process should include
mechanisms to  provide confidence that degraded SSC
conditions adverse to quality are identified and evaluated.
Most licensees may assign a particular plant employee to a
plant area or system who would be responsible for the
identification of deficiencies and placing the particular
item in the work identification process.  Poor housekeeping,
inoperable  lighting, inoperable equipment and
instrumentation, or inoperable fire protection equipment are
signs of lack of ownership or ineffectiveness in the
identification and/or resolution of conditions adverse to
quality.  Plant and contractor personnel should interviewed
to ascertain whether they utilize the licensee's work
identification process and have confidence that deficiencies
will be corrected.
c. Machinery history and operating logs can indicate recurring
problems, ineffective corrective maintenance, and the extent
or lack of preventive maintenance.  The licensee should be
using surveillance data and trends to revise the scope or
scheduling of preventive maintenance, spare parts
availability, or other considerations that enhance
reliability and availability of similar or redundant
equipment. 
d. The licensee system should incorporate periodic review of the
backlog and include mechanism(s) to bring additional
management attention and resources to items which remain on
the maintenance list beyond their originally established
resolution dates.  Appropriate management approvals should be
required to postpone or cancel scheduled maintenance; these
decisions should be justified.  If the inspector determines
that operational work-a-rounds are long standing, they could
potentially represent a de-facto modification, placing the
facility outside its licensing basis.
e. The licensee's work prioritization system should incorporate
the safety significance of the item and TS limiting62801 - 8 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
conditions for operation requirements.  Time goals should be
established for the completion of work activities.
f. The degree of inclusion of the elements described in
paragraph 02.01f will vary with the significance and
complexity of the maintenance or surveillance task.  Not all
elements need be included for simple tasks or tasks with low
safety significance.  The assessment of maintenance
effectiveness could be based on the timely identification of
deficient or degrading SSCs; successful determination of
safety significance and priority; effective planning and
scheduling; and, equivalent or increased SSC reliability upon
completion of the activity.  Surveillance effectiveness could
be based on the minimization of out-of-service time, the
ability of the instrument to remain operable between
surveillances, and the identification of degrading
performance prior to instrument inoperability.
The NRC staff has observed that there have been cases where
a decommissioning licensee had decided to forego periodic
preventive maintenance (such as pump and motor rebuilds) and
run equipment to failure.  This type of maintenance
philosophy would more than likely be applied to SSCs that are
not required for the safe storage of spent fuel, TS
requirements, SSCs outside of the Maintenance Rule, or SSCs
that are not required for accident mitigation or prevention.
The  inspector should ascertain whether this type of
maintenance is utilized by the licensee and assess its effect
on safe fuel storage or the conduct of safe decommissioning.
g. Licensees should have procedures for the conduct of
troubleshooting.  Although detailed step-by-step procedures
may not be developed for a  particular troubleshooting
activity, a general procedure should or could be in-use which
provides the appropriate administrative controls,
precautions,  and prerequisites.  In addition, procedures
should be appropriate to the circumstances.  For example a
plant operator or certified fuel handler checking and
replacing a fuse would normally be considered trained and
qualified to replace fuses, in systems under the operator's
control, without a procedure or work order.  However, the
activity still needs to be properly controlled, in part,
through the use of approvals, documentation, and appropriate
post-troubleshooting  verification.  On the other hand, if the
troubleshooting is intrusive, in that it:  breaks a system
pressure boundary; changes the electrical characteristics of
a circuit (such as the installation of test equipment,
recorders, or multimeters into non-test jack locations);
defeats an alarm, indicator, or other system instrument; or,
prevents,  precludes, or challenges the operability or
functionality of an SSC, additional work controls should be
applied.
03.02 Implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65).
The Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) is required to be implemented
by all operating power reactor licensees and power reactor
licensees that have submitted 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) certifications.Issue Date:  08/11/97 - 9 - 62801
Therefore, a primary objective this IP is to ascertain whether
decommissioning  SSCs, are effectively incorporated into the program
and to periodically confirm that the licensee is effectively
implementing the rule by evaluating maintenance monitoring during
decommissioning.  It is not expected that the inspector
implementing this IP perform a baseline comprehensive inspection of
the decommissioning licensee's Maintenance Rule program.  Further,
for a number of reactor plants, Maintenance Rule base-line
inspections have been performed utilizing IP 62706, "Maintenance
Rule."  The inspector should brief the appropriate NRR or NMSS
Project Manager, if programmatic problems are identified.
The inspector should independently review the licensee accident
analysis as described in the FSAR, PSDAR, or licensee procedures to
identify the SSCs that could be within scope.  The inspector should
then evaluate the licensee's determination for placing SSCs within
or out of scope, based on the criteria described herein.
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.160 and NUMARC 93-01 provide guidance on
implementation  of the Maintenance Rule.  Inspection Procedure
62706, "Maintenance Rule," and IP 62707, "Maintenance Observation,"
for operating reactors can also be used as references.  Appendix A
of IP 62706 and EGM 96-01 and EGM 96-02 provides enforcement
guidance for the assessment violations applicable to Maintenance
Rule deficiencies.  Any proposed violations shall be reviewed and
concurred by the Quality Assurance and Maintenance Branch, NRR.
SSCs Within the Scope of the Maintenance Rule.  SSCs include
anything that could be called a structure, system, or component
including walls, floors, roofs, tanks, sub-systems, sub-components,
parts, pumps, valves, motors, pipes, hangers, snubbers, and
anything else that meets the definition in 10 CFR 50.65.  Other
SSCs could include, but are not limited to:  the SFP liner and
cooling system, spent fuel racks, criticality control design
features, radiation monitoring and radiological effluent
instrumentation, and spent fuel lifting and handling equipment.
Similarly, SSCs associated with the maintenance of independent
spent fuel storage facilities (ISFSIs) are required to be within
scope, if the ISFSI is licensed pursuant to 10 CFR 72, Subpart K,
"General License for Storage of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites."
Whereas maintenance would typically refer to SSCs associated with
spent fuel pool water chemistry, biological, or environmental
control, SSCs associated with ISFSIs could include, but are not
limited to spent fuel:  multi-assembly sealed baskets (MSB); MSB
transfer casks; ventilated concrete storage containers;
transportation casks and lifting equipment; ISFSI pad foundation;
lifting equipment; and, MSB air purging and water level control
systems. 
SSCs That Are Credited for Accident Mitigation or Transients.
Paragraph (b)(2)(i) of the Maintenance Rule states that SSCs used
to  mitigate accidents or transients or are used in emergency
operating procedures (EOPs) are required to be included within the
scope of the rule.  For a plant undergoing decommissioning, EOPs
may not be applicable or be significantly scaled back from that of
an operating power reactor.  Nonetheless, SSCs that mitigate the62801 - 10 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
consequences of a decommissioning accident (such as fuel drop,
inadvertent criticality, zirconium fuel fire, etc.) or transient
(such as high radiation levels caused by a loss of shielding) could
include SSCs such as:  walls credited for radiation attenuation,
seismic qualification, or structural support; SFP water supplies
and control systems credited for spent fuel temperature control
and/or radiation protection; and, ventilation systems required to
minimize radiation exposures on or off site.  A decommissioning
licensee may have implemented procedures that require operator
response to spent fuel or SFP accidents or transients utilizing
various plant SSCs to mitigate or preclude the situation; these
SSCs would be considered within scope.
Other SSCs.  There are other SSCs that may also be included in the
licensee maintenance rule program because they may prevent other
equipment from being damaged or contaminated in the event of an
emergency, not because they are relied upon to mitigate an
accident.  An example of an SSC that might be included is a fire
protection system capable of supplying a significant fraction of
what is required to mitigate an accident.  In this case, if the
decommissioning  licensee takes significant credit for a fire
protection system water supply in their response to SFP accidents
or transients, that systems would be within the scope of the rule.
Additional guidance can be found in NUMARC 93-01.
SSCs Outside the Scope of the Maintenance Rule.  Unless they meet
the criteria described above, the following categories of SSCs are
generally outside the scope of the maintenance rule:  fire
protection systems, seismic class II SSCs installed in proximity to
seismic class I SSCs, security systems, and emergency facilities
described in the licensee's emergency plan.  Further guidance is
provided in section 8.2.1.6 of NUMARC 93-01.
Safety Determination.  The rule requires that goals be established
commensurate with safety.  Implementation of the rule in accordance
with NUMARC 93-01 requires that a safety determination be performed
for all SSCs within the scope of the rule.  The safety
determination would then be taken into account when setting goals
and monitoring under (a)(1) and establishing performance criteria
under (a)(2).  The safety determination method would utilize the
expert panel methodology and possibly the Delphi method as
discussed in NUREG/CR-5424.  Also, a licensee undergoing
decommissioning may utilize probablistic risk assessment (PRA)
information or Individual Plant Examination (IPE) insights in the
determination of safety significance; however, the use of PRA
information by decommissioning licensees for safety determinations
is not be required.  Refer to NUMARC 93-01 and Regulatory Guide
1.160 for additional details on the use of PRA information.
Determination of (a)(1) or (a)(2) Status.  NUMARC 93-01 provides
guidance that initially places all SSCs under paragraph (a)(2) and
are only moved under paragraph (a)(1) if experience indicates that
the performance or condition is not adequately controlled through
preventive  maintenance as evidence by the failure to meet a
performance criterion or by experiencing repetitive maintenance
preventible functional failures (see NUMARC 93-01, Appendix B, for
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decommissioning licensee may initially place any SSC under either
paragraph, if appropriately justified; however, it is expected that
the majority of decommissioning SSCs will be under (a)(1).
Monitoring of SSCs.  The rule requires that decommissioning
licensees monitor the performance of condition of SSCs in a manner
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance the SSCs are capable of
fulfilling their intended functions.  It is intended that licensees
be allowed considerable flexibility in the methods used to monitor
SSC performance or condition.  It is expected that most monitoring
will be done at the plant, system, or train level rather than at
the component level.  In cases where a specific component has been
identified as the cause of multiple system maintenance preventible
failures, the licensee may elect to monitor at the component level.
Parameters monitored at the system or train level could include
temperature,  pressure, flow velocity, voltage, current, or
vibration, as well as, availability and/or reliability.  Train
level monitoring provides a method of addressing degraded
performance of a single train even though the system function is
still available.  For low safety significant SSCs, monitoring at
the availability/reliability level may be sufficient.
Similar to systems and components, the monitoring of structures
should provide sufficient assurance that performance and condition
will not degrade below established standards.  Licensees may take
credit for or build upon existing monitoring activities already in
place for structures.  These activities could include:  leak
detection surveillance; visual inspections; crack propagation
monitoring; or, operator or engineering staff structural integrity
assessments.  For structures that are not amenable to monitoring,
engineering evaluations should be performed to establish condition
monitoring criteria.  These evaluations could assess, for example,
design safety margins, corrosion susceptibility, or environmental
conditions.  All monitoring activities should have specific
quantitative and/or qualitative criteria for monitoring.
For decommissioning licensees, licensees shall monitor the
performance or condition of all SSCs associated with the storage,
control, and maintenance of spent fuel in a safe condition.  For
example, a licensee could establish SFP leakage monitoring; measure
and trend concrete crack or spalling propagation; SFP heat
exchanger performance;  SFP pump capacity, vibration, or
differential  pressure testing; ventilation capacity and
differential  pressure testing; and radiation monitoring
surveillance testing.  For fuel handling equipment, a licensee
monitoring program could include visual and capacity  testing,
freedom of motion, or limit switch testing.  A licensee should
assess whether their fuel handling equipment, grapple, jib crane,
polar crane, and spent fuel maintenance inspection stand are
required to be monitored under (a)(1).  For criticality control
monitoring, a licensee could survey SFP boron concentration, SFP
temperature, or spent fuel rack or boraflex integrity.  For
monitoring of the SFP liner integrity, a licensee could
analytically assess the SFP evaporation rate, survey chemistry
control limits, or perform ground water monitoring.  For monitoring
of ISFSI SSCs, monitoring could include, but is not limited to:
monitoring of radiation levels; visual inspections of material62801 - 12 - Issue Date:  08/11/97
condition; surveillance testing of lifting and handling equipment
capacity, limit switches, and freedom of motion; pump fill and
evacuation rates; and, ventilation flow testing.
Goal Setting.  Licensees have a great deal of flexibility in
determining goals (i.e., performance objectives).  Licensees may
elect to choose system, train, or component level goals;
performance-related goals (reliability and availability); or, goals
based on system parameters such as flow, pressure, differential
pressure, or electric current and voltage.  Goals need to be based
on licensee experience, SSC safety significance, and where
practicable industry-wide experience.  Performance objectives (or
goals) could be as simple as extrapolations of surveillance or
calibration criteria.
Demonstrated Effective Maintenance.   The monitoring of an SSC as
specified in paragraph (a)(1) is not required if the licensee
demonstrates that the performance or condition of the SSC is being
effectively  controlled through the  performance of appropriate
preventive maintenance so that the SSC can perform its intended
function.  Under paragraph (a)(2), preventive maintenance must be
demonstrated to be effective in controlling the performance or
condition of the SSC so that the SSC remains capable of performing
its intended function.  Therefore, in order to show that preventive
maintenance is effective, the licensee must conduct some evaluation
or monitoring under (a)(2).  As described in the Statements of
Consideration for 10 CFR 50.65, the purpose of (a)(2) is to provide
an alternative approach for those SSCs where it is not necessary to
establish the monitoring program required by paragraph (a)(1).
62801-04 RESOURCE  ESTIMATE
Inspection resources for this inspection procedure will vary from
site to site based on NRC management's assessment of licensee
performance.  In addition, inspection resources will be dependent
on the phase of decommissioning being implemented.  For planning
purposes, however, it is estimated that approximately 28 onsite
inspection hours will be needed to adequately assess licensee
maintenance and surveillance semi-annually.
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